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Introduction:

PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND FACTOR PRICE DISPARITY
IN THE SLAUGHTER CATTLE MARKET: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

The theoretical analysis of competitive firm behavior under economic

uncertainty has been explored in the areas of input and output price uncertainty

in the papers by Baron (1970), Sandmo (1971), Batra and Ullah (1974), and Blair
(1974) among others.

The issue of the competitive firm facing production

uncertainty generated by input quality variability was addressed in a paper by
Ratti and Ullah (1976).

Other papers applied their approach to specific areas,

such as, wage discrimination being explained by labor quality variability. 1

A simple model of a competitive firm confronting production uncertainty,

generated by the variability in the flow of factor service (input), is presented
The authors believe that the assumptions of the model developed in this

below.

paper provides a realistic description of the short run behavior of firms engaged

in meat packing operations in the upper midwest and purchasing cattle in the

slaughter cattle market.

This paper follows the approach used to analyze production uncertainty

developed by Ratti and Ullah. The purpose of our study is to analyze firm

behavior when it must purchase its input (steers) in an auction market under two

different informational conditions. This in essence, creates two submarkets for
the purchasing of the input.

The firm has either complete information or

incomplete information concerning the "contribution to production" of the input

it is purchasing. 2 Incomplete information implies that there is uncertainty over

the "contribution to production" of the input when purchased.

The term

"contribution to production", will be denoted CTP throughout the rest of the
paper.3
1

For example see the paper by Baldwin (1991).

2
"Contribution to production", refers to that part of total product
attributable to a particular input (slaughter cattle).

3
The issue of uncertainty over the "contribution to production", is an
issue of quantity and quality uncertainty. The yield of a carcass effects the
total supply of the final output (beef), i.e., uncertainty over dressing
percentage. The quality of an animal effects the quality of the final product

1

It is assumed that sellers of the input (cattle producers) have the choice

of selling their product under either market alternative. It is further assumed

that the firm (packer) is forced to compete in both markets when it purchases its
input requirements.

This is a reasonable assumption for firms operating in the

meatpacking industry.

If sellers choose method (A) to sell their product, then

there is full information on the input's CTP when the firm makes its input

purchase at the auction determined price. This is the profit maximization under
certainty case for the firm. If sellers choose method (B) to sell their product,

then there is uncertainty over the input's CTP when the firm makes its input
purchase at the auction determined price.4 Thus, sellers are separating the
market for their product into two distinct submarkets.5

The model analyzes the firm's input purchasing decisions within this market

structure.

The theoretical results derived in the model are then empirically

tested using data from the

u.s. slaughter cattle market to determine if there is

statistical evidence to support the conclusions of the model.
In section 1, the model is presented.

In section 2, the relationship

between a firm's preference toward risk and production uncertainty is analyzed.
In section 3, the issue of firm input pricing behavior across market alternatives

is addressed. In section 4, the effect of a change in the variability of the
input's contribution to production on firm input purchasing behavior is examined.
In section s, the results derived in sections 3 and 4 are empirically tested.

The theoretical analysis demonstrates that a risk neutral firm will pay

less for an input with uncertainty over its CTP in a auction market, than for an
input when its contribution is known with certainty.

The implication of this

(beef), i.e., uncertainty over the grade.

4 Marketing method (A) represents the grade and yield method of marketing
and method (B) is the live weight method of marketing. Ward (1987) provides a
detailed description of these two marketing methods.
5
It is assumed that cattle producers sell all of their herd in one market.
They do not sell part of their herd in one market and the rest in the other
market.

2

result is that firm purchasing behavior is generating price disparity.6

As

uncertainty over an input's contribution increases, the price paid for the input

The implication of this result is

declines as compared to the certainty case.

that as uncertainty increases, the degree of price disparity increases.

The

empirical study in section 5 provides strong evidence that there does exist price
differentials between the full information marketing method and incomplete

information marketing method for slaughter cattle.
I. Assumptions and the Model:

The analysis assumes a short run time frame for the firm (packer). The firm

operates in a competitive setting in both the output and factor markets.7
inputs are assumed to be fixed except one.

All

The one variable input X (one unit

of cattle ) must be purchased in an auction market, where sellers have the choice

of selling their product via a full information marketing method (A) or an

incomplete information marketing method (B).8

The firm is forced to compete in

both markets and the information that is available concerning X's CTP when
purchased in market (B) is assumed symmetric.9

It is assumed that the firm's

purchasing decisions with respect to the two marketing methods are independent,

and they are determined by demand and supply conditions in the output market.

Once the firm has purchased the slaughter cattle, X, via method (A) or (B), X's
CTP becomes known to the firm. Hence, the method employed to purchase X has no

effect on the production process. Therefore, it is assumed that the price paid
for cattle by the firm is based on profit maximization criteria and is dependent

6
Price disparity, unlike price discrimination, is not generated by market
failure, e.g., the packer does not exert monopsony power.

7 The authors recognize that the number of firms engaged in the meatpacking
industry do not meet the criteria for a perfectly competitive market. However,
our paper will show that price discrimination can occur in the absence of market
power, and if there is market power present then it would most likely affect the
mean level of prices being paid in the market and not alter the price
differentials found in the submarketa.
8

one unit of cattle refers to per head, per pen, etc.

9
We are assuming that the slaughter cattle market does not have an
asymmetric information problem.

3

on how they purchase X.

However, the pricing decision arrived at for method (A)

is independent of the pricing decision arrived at for method (B). 10

This type

of market environment generates a firm pricing strategy that produces price
disparity.

This set of assumptions,

in the authors'

opinion,

provides a

realistic description of the slaughter cattle market in the United States. 11
Assume a short run production process that uses only one variable input X,
slaughter cattle.

Define X as unit of slaughter cattle acquired for current use

in the production of beef products. If slaughter cattle are purchased in market
(A), then the firm knows the amount of output that can be generated by input X. 12
If slaughter cattle are purchased in market (B), then X1 represents the unit of
slaughter cattle available for the production of beef. Given that actual quality
of slaughter cattle is not known if purchased in market (B), its CTP is uncertain
at the time of purchase.

In order for the firm to maximize total profit the

ratio of the marginal physical products (MPP) of X to X1 must be equal to the
ratio of the prices paid for X and X1 •
Following the modeling procedure developed by Ratti and Ullah, X and X1 are
linked in the following way:
X1

::

vX

(1)

where v is a strictly positive random variable with the variable's density
function defined as f (v) with a unit mean. 13

10
Independence is only assumed for individual lots of cattle purchased via
method (A) or (B) and not for the mean price level found in the two markets. That
is, the mean price level in both submarkets are dependent on the output price.

Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner (1993), discuss the structure of the slaughter
cattle market and provide empirical evidence that average profits to cattle
feeders vary among marketing methods.
11

Cattle are not homogenous inputs, however, their
contribution to production is known with certainty when they are
purchased via the G&Y market.
12

13
In the following analysis, the model developed in this paper is a
modified version of the model developed by Ratti and Ullah. Ratti and Ullah give
credit to Walters (1960), and Rooclman (1972) for the method of specification of
the input variables. In this paper, as in the paper by Ratti and Ullah, the issue
is uncertainty over the flow of factor services to production.

4

The firm's short run production function when it purchases in market A or

B is defined as,

Q = h (X1 ) = h (vX), h' (Xi ) > 0, h" (Xi ) < O.

(2)

The third derivative of the production function is assumed to exist, and the

marginal product of the input is positive but declining.

of the input is the first derivative of the input's CTP.

The marginal product

If X is purchased in market (A), then v is assumed to be a constant, with

a value of one.

If X is purchased in market (B), then v is defined as a random

variable, which implies output

(Q)

is also a random variable.

The random

variable v is assumed to be positive with the variable• s density function defined

Given the nature

as f (v), and the expected value of v is defined as E(v] = 1.

of the live market (market B) for slaughter cattle, it is reasonable to assume

that on average firms are correct about the quality of the cattle purchased.

Thus, the unit mean assumption imposed on v is reasonable.14

Beginning with firm behavior under certainty (market A), it is assumed the

firm's goal is to maximize profits Il· The variables p, r, and C are defined

respectively as the output price of beef and the input price of slaughter cattle

and the fixed cost.

The firm's profit function is defined as

TI= p•h (X) - r·X - C.

(3)

The first order condition for profit maximization is
dil/dX = p•h' (X) - r = O.

The second order condition for profit maximization is
d2Il/dX2 = p•h" (X) < 0.

(4)
(5)

Rearranging the equation 4, the following equilibrium condition is arrived at
p•h' (X) = r or p = r/h' (X).

(6)

Equilibrium condition (6) is the standard result. The firm will purchase the

input for a price equal to its marginal value product (MVP), i.e., the value of
its marginal contribution to the production of beef.

Cattle buyers make a living purchasing cattle in the live market.
Therefore, one would not expect systematic errors in their bidding over time.
14

5

If firms purchase a unit of cattle in market (B), then there is uncertainty

over the CTP of that unit purchased. In other words, the CTP of the unit

purchased becomes a random variable. Profit is now defined in terms of expected

utility. Assuming that the firm's utility function conforms to characteristics

of a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and its third derivative exists,
the firm's expected utility from profit can be written as

E[U (II)J = E(U (p•h (Xi ) - r•X - C)] .

( 7)

It is assumed that the marginal utility of profit is positive U' (II) > O,

and the value of U' (II) being negative if the firm is risk averse, 0 if the firm
is risk neutral, and positive if the firm is risk preferring.

The first order condition for maximizing expected utility of profit is

dE[u <II)

) / dX

= E(u' (II)• (p •v• h' (Xi ) - r)) = 0.

The second order condition is

d2E[U (II)J/dX2 = E(U' (II)• (p•v•h' (Xi ) - r)2

+

p• v2•h' (Xi )•U' <II>) < O.

(8)

(9)

II. The Effect of Uncertainty on Firm Behavior:

The issue in this section is, how uncertainty over the input's CTP, in

conjunction with the firm's attitude toward risk, affect the rate of return paid

to the cattle producer by the firm (packer). The analysis begins with rewriting

equation (8) in the following manner
E[U' (II)• (p•v •h ' (Xi ))) = E[U' (II)J•r.

(10)

p•E(v•h' (Xi )] = r - {p•Cov (U', v·h' (Xi )) / E[U' <II>] }.

(11)

Adopting Horowitz's (1970) alternative way of expressing equation (10),
From above it is clear that the MPP and MVP of slaughter cattle are now

random variables given by v•h' (Xi ) and p•v•h' (Xi ) respectively. Examining the

covariance term in equation (11), it is clear that when u• <II> = O, the covariance
term is also equal to zero.

The implication of equation (11) is that the risk

neutral firm purchases cattle in the live market for r = E[MVP).

U' (II) � O, the sign of the covariance term can not be ascertained.

However, when
However, it

can be demonstrated that when it is assumed that the elasticity of the marginal
6

product curve of the input has an absolute value of less than one, then sign Cov

u• <II> :

= sign

I'= dh' (Xi )/dX1 • Xt fh' (Xi ) = X1 •h' (Xi )/h' (Xi ) > -1.

(12)

If equation (12) is true, then examining the derivatives of the two components

of the covariance term with respect to v,

d[v •h' (Xi )] /dv = h ' ( X1 ) • [ 1 + I) > 0,

(13 )

and

dU' (fl)/dv = U* (I1)•p•X•h' (Xi ),
verifies that sign Cov = sign
is dependent on

u·cII>·
at

u•cII>,

(14)

u•cII>·

That is, since the sign of equation (14)

and equation (13 ) is positive, sign Cov must equal sign

Applying this result to equation (11), the following condition is arrived

p •E(v•h' (Xi )] Z

r,

depending on whether u• <TI>

t

(15)

O.

The above result can be interpreted as follows; at the margin: 1) the risk

neutral firm will purchase a unit of cattle at a price equal to its E[MVP] in the

live market; 2) the risk averse firm will purchase a unit of cattle at a price
less than its E[MVP] in the live market; and 3 ) the risk preferring firm will

purchase a unit of cattle at a price greater than its E[MVP] in the live market.

The implications of these results are that firm's input demand for X is dependent

on its attitude toward risk. 15

III, Market Separation and Price Disparity:

In this section the analysis will begin with the assumption that the firm

is risk neutral.

As stated above, sellers of slaughter cattle choose one of two

methods to sell their cattle and firms purchase cattle under both systems.

This

market structure implies that there are actually two submarkets for slaughter

cattle.

This paper assumes that the firm's purchasing decisions in each market

15
These results are consistent with the results derived in the paper by
Ratti and Ullah.

7

are made independently because of the informational disparities between the two
submarkets with respect to the input's CTP.

It follows that, independent profit

maximization decisions with respect to purchases of X are made for each
submarket. The implication is that the meat packing firm will maximize profit by
setting MVP=MC in each market.

Rearranging equations (6) and (11), yields

equations 16 and 17 respectively;
(16)

p = r/h' (X),
and
p = [r - {p•Cov (U',v•h'(X1 )) /E[U' (Il) ]}) / E[v•h'(X i ) ].

To simplify the analysis, replace r in equation (17) with r* •

(17)
Given that output

price p is the same regardless of the input market the firm purchases in, the
following equilibrium condition is derived from equations (16) and (17) ,
r/h' (X) = (r* - {p•Cov(U' ,v •h' (Xi ) )/E[U' (Il) l}l / E[v•h'(Xi ) ]. (18)
Equation (18) leads to the first proposition in the paper:
PROPOSITION I.
If a risk neutral firm purchases its inputs from two
(seller separated) submarkets, where the two subgroups have equal average
productivity and differ only in the amount of information available on an input's
CTP, then the firm will purchase the input from the group with the uncertainty
over its CTP at a lower price than from the group where the CTP is known with
perfect information.

To establish the above proposition, it is assumed that the third derivative
of the production function is negative.

This implies that the marginal product

function h'(Xi ) is itself a concave function. This assumption is consistent with
equation (12) , and implies that dl'/dX1 < O.

The implications of h• (Xi ) <0 is that

the MPP of X1 is a non-increasing function of X1 • 16

Under the assumption that

h• (Xd <O, and employing Jensen's inequality the following result is attained,
(19)

E[h'(vX)] < h' (X) .17

As noted by Ratti and Ullah, this assumption is consistent
with many of the common forms of production functions used in
economic analysis. For example, the Cobb-Douglas and CES production
functions have this property.
16

17

The Jensen inequality states that if a function is concave the following
is true: E[h (X) ] < h[E (X)]. The implication for our model is that the MPP of X
in an uncertain environment is less than the MPP of X if production had taken
place with the expected value of the random variable X, i.e., a certain
environment. See Rao (1973, p.58) for an explanation of Jensen's inequality.
8

Equation (19) implies that the risk neutral firm's expected MPP generated

by X1 is less than the MPP that would be achieved under conditions of certainty
given the same factor combination.

Certainty implies a situation where the

random variable v is replaced by its expected value. Applying the result derived

in equation (19} to equation (18) implies that for the risk neutral firm, r must
be greater than r*.

This establishes proposition I.

Proposition I demonstrates that a perfectly competitive firm facing a

competitive but segregated market structure for factor inputs, and the two

submarkets varying only on the information available on the input's CTP, will

engage in a pricing strategy that generates price disparity.

all cattle are paid their expected marginal value product.

That is, although

However, firms in a

sense are discriminating between the two groups because they have equal average

productivity, but sellers receive unequal average returns for their cattle. This

proposition presents an interesting case of a firm's pricing strategy producing
a form of price discrimination (disparity} in its factor market without market
power.

If it is assumed that the firm is risk averse,

then equation

demonstrates that the degree of price disparity will increase.

statement leads to the second proposition of the paper;

(18)

This last

PROPOSITION II. The degree of price disparity that is generated between
market alternatives will vary positively with the degree of firm risk aversion.

To established proposition II, proposition I is reasserted.

Proposition I

established that r is greater than r* for the risk neutral firm.

Then by

equations (15 & 18), r* must be greater than say any r-, the price that a risk
averse firm would pay for a unit of cattle in the live market.
proposition II is established.

Thus,

Note: risk neutrality implies that the covariance terms in equations 17 & 18 are
zero.
9

IV. Comparative statics: A Decline In Uncertainty:

In this section the effect of an change in the amount of information

available to the firm on the CTP of a unit of cattle purchased in market (B) is

examined.

A change in the amount of information available implies a change in

the amount of uncertainty associated with X marketed via marketing method (B).

To capture this effect of a marginal change in uncertainty, the distribution of
v will under-go a mean preserving change in the dispersion of the distribution.

The results developed below are only determinant in the risk neutral case. A
modification of equation (8) is now undertaken by replacing v with v*= (a•v + B),

where a is a shift parameter and B is a function of a with the following

properties:

1) B' = -E[v) = -1, and 2) B (a=l) = O.
(a•v + B)•X.

dE [

II J /dX =

This transformation implies that X1 =

Assuming the firm is risk neutral equation (8) is now

E[p •v*•h' (Xi ) - r] =

0.

( 2 0)

Replacing v* with (a•v + B), and renaming equation (20) E(Z],
E[Z] = E(p• (a•v + B) •h' (X1)

-

r] = 0,

the comparative static analysis can begin.

(2 1)

Invoking the implicit function

theorem around the equilibrium value of X and a=l,

then taking the total

differential of E(Z] and setting all of the differentials to zero except dX and

da, the partial derivative

ax;aa

ax;aa

is derived

= -E[{p• (v-l)•h' (Xi )• (l +I)}/ {p•v"'2•h" (Xi )}] .

(22)

The sign of the partial derivative derived above can be determined by examining
the following relationship:

p•E [ (v-1 )•h' (Xi )• (1 + I) ) = Cov ( (v-1), h' (Xi )• (1 + I)) • ( 2 3 )

By ascertaining the sign of Cov ( (v-1), h' (Xi )• (1 + I)) , the sign of the numerator
of equation (23) can be determined.

Examining the derivatives of the two

components of the covariance term with respect to v,

d[h' (Xi )• (l+I') )/dv < O,

(24)

and

d (v-1)/dv = 1 > O,

(25 )
10

verifies that the sign of the covariance is negative and thus the sign of the
partial derivative

ax;aa

<

o.

The above result leads to the third proposition of the paper:

PROPOSITION III. For risk neutral firms, as uncertainty over CTP declines,
the degree of price disparity between marketing alternatives will decline.
To establish the above proposition the implications of

are analyzed.

ax;aa

being negative

The negative sign indicates that as the uncertainty over CTP

declines, demand for cattle via marketing method (B) increases. The implication

is that for a fixed unit amount of cattle purchased, a decrease in uncertainty

increases the expected MPP of a unit of cattle.
E[v*•h' (Xi )] when a < 1.

This means that E(v•h' (Xi )] <

Examining this result in the context of equation (18),

an increase in the expected MPP of a unit of cattle purchased via marketing
method (B) will increase r* relative to r.

Thus, the degree of price disparity

declines as uncertainty declines and thus proposition III is established.

v.

Empirical Findings: The Slaughter cattle Market.

In this section two hypothesis tests are constructed to test if there is

evidence to support propositions I and III.

The data for the empirical analysis

were collected from the South Dakota Retained Ownership Demonstration Proiect. 18

Over a three year period beginning in April of 1991 218 pens of cattle were
marketed via the grade and yield marketing method. 19 Market price data for the

live and dressed weight markets were collected for the same type of cattle in the

same marketing area�.

This enabled us to construct average revenue per pen for

The Dept. of Animal and Range Science at South Dakota State
A description of the
University is administering the project.
project can be found in Wagner, et al. {1991, 1992 and 1993).
18

19
Marketing cattle in pens is a common practice in this market. Each pen
in the demonstration project contained five steers.

� Hartman indicated the cattle from the project were representative of the
cattle being purchased in the general market area. The Nebraska Direct Dressed
and Live weight market prices were obtained from Data Transmission Network and
the USDA, Livestock and Wool statistics, and were then adjusted down for the
local basis by $1/cwt and $0.6 4/cwt for dressed and live weight, respectively.
11

the cattle in the project for all three markets.

Thus, it is possible to make

a comparison of average revenue received per head for each pen of cattle in the

project under three different marketing methods; 1) live weight, 2) dressed
weight, and 3) grade and yield. 21

This unique data set allowed the following

empirical testing procedures to be used to test if there is a difference in

average revenue paid for a particular pen of cattle across the three marketing

methods. The empirical testing of proposition I below will employ the "Difference
between Population Means: Matched Pairs Test". �

To test proposition I, the null hypothesis is, average revenue per pen paid

to sellers in the live and grade & yield marketing methods are equal.

Against

the alternative that average revenue per pen paid is higher in the grade & yield

marketing method.

HYPOTHESES TEST I

Ho: ux - u>' = a
Hl: ux - u)' > a
Decision rule: reject Ho if the following is true
a I <s 11/n'"> > t,..1,..,
where 6 = l: (xi-Yi) /n and s11 = [l/ (n-l)• {l:u? - nu2 }]
ux is the population mean value of revenue paid per pen in the grade &
yield marketing method. U>' is the population mean value of the revenue paid per

pen in the live marketing method. The variable xi is the average revenue paid for

the i� pen in the grade & yield market. The variable y1 is the average revenue
paid for the i� pen in the live market. The variable s0 is the observed sample
standard deviation for the n differences: ui = (xcy1 ).
If the null hypothesis is rejected, it can be concluded that

there is

evidence to suggest that average revenue paid per pen in the grade & yield market

21
Average revenue per pen implies that the total revenue per pen received
is divided by the number of cattle in that pen.

� A description of the "Difference between Population Means: Matched Pairs
Test" can be found in Newbold (1991, pp. 377-80). The robustness of the test is
dependent on the distribution of the differences following a normal distribution.
The Bowman/Shelton test for normality was conducted and a test statistic of • 9314
was derived. This result strongly supports the assumption that the distribution
of differences is normal for the data used to test proposition I. A description
of the normality test can be found in Newbold (1991, pp. 442-44).
12

is higher than in the live market.

The results of the hypothesis test produced

a mean difference of average revenue per pen paid of $9. 22, and a t statistic of

5. 33. The null hypothesis is rejected with a p-value of . 0001. The conclusion is

that there is strong evidence in favor of proposition I, which implies that there
is a price differential between the two marketing systems.

An increase in information on an input's contribution to production implies

a decrease in uncertainty.

The dressed weight marketing method represents an

intermediate marketing method between live and grade & yield with respect to the

amount of information available to buyers in the slaughter cattle market. The

testing procedure used above is not the appropriate testing procedure because the
distribution of the differences between live and dressed weight is not normal. D
To test proposition III,

the null hypothesis becomes, the distribution of

differences for revenue per pen paid to sellers in the live and dressed weight

marketing methods is centered on zero.

Against the alternative that the center

of the distribution is greater than zero.

HYPOTHESIS TEST I I

Ho: Distribution is centered o n zero
Hl: Center of distribution is greater than zero
Decision rule: reject Ho if the following is tru
(T-µT)/aT < -z,, ,
where T is the observed value of the Wilcoxon statistic
and µT, aT are the E (T) and Var (T) respectively.
If the null hypothesis is rejected, it can be concluded that

there is

evidence to suggest that average revenue paid per pen in the dressed weight
market is higher than in the live market.

The implication of a rejection of the

null hypothesis is that price disparity declines as uncertainty declines.

The mean difference of average revenue per pen paid for dressed weight

minus live weight is $6. 74, and a

z test statistic derived from the Wilcoxon test

is -2. 365 5 . The null hypothesis is clearly rejected with a p-value of .01. The

D The Bowman-Shelton test statistic derived from this data is 10. 51. The
assumption that the distribution of the differences is normal is rejected with
a p-value of less than .OS. Therefore, the non-parametric Wilcoxon Test (large
sample), will be employed to test if there is evidence to support proposition
III. A description of the Wilcoxon test can be found in Newbold (1991, pp. 419423).
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conclusion is that there is strong evidence in favor of proposition I II, which

implies that the price differential (disparity) between the two marketing systems

declines as uncertainty declines.
VI. SUMMARY:

A short run model of a competitive firm facing uncertainty over a factor's

CTP was presented in this paper.

The assumptions of the model reflect, in the

authors• opinion, a realistic characterization of the U.S. slaughter cattle

market.

The paper provides a theoretical explanation and empirical evidence of

packer purchasing behavior, in the absence of market failure, generating price
disparity, .

Under the assumptions of the model, it was demonstrated first that a

competitive, risk neutral firm will engage in a pricing strategy that will

produce price disparity when it purchases a single input in two submarkets which

differ only in the amount of information available on the CTP of the single

factor.

Next, it was shown that the degree of price disparity is positively

related to the degree of firm risk aversion.

The final theoretical result

established that the degree of price disparity is inversely related to the amount
of information available on an input's CTP.

The empirical section of the paper provides strong support for the

existence of factor price disparity due to uncertainty over an input• s CTP.
Evidence also was provided in support of an inverse relationship between the

degree of price disparity and the amount of information available on a factor's

CTP.

The findings presented in this paper raise new questions on how uncertainty

affects competitive factor markets. A natural extension of this research is to

relax the assumption of competitive factor markets. Another possible extension
would be to relax the assumption of symmetric information.
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FACTOR QUALITY UNCERTAINTY, FACTOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION
THEORY AND EVIDENCE

AND THE COMPETITIVE FIRM:

MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
E(), 8:

dE[U(Il)]

_ ,;{ dU(Il)

dx

- -l

an

u' CII>

dU(Il)

dll

�]

v

dll = P • v · h' (x1)
dx
E(). 8:

E() 9:

dE[U(Il)]

dx

d 2 E[UCII> l =
dx 2

-

r

= E [U' (II) · (P •

v

J d uclI)
""l dll2
2

dlI
dx

· h' (x1)

-

r)]

d U(IT)

dll

]

In the paper EQ. 9 is derived in the same manner as EQ. 8.

EQ. 9 in the

paper can be derived following the mathematical expression given above.
EQ. 10:

EQ(lO) is just EQ (8) rearranged.

EQ. 11:

Horowitz, p. 364-367 uses the following definition E(xy) = E(y)

• E(x) + COV(x,y).

E{U' <II>]

•

Thus the left hand side of EQ. 10 is equalivant to

E[P • v • h' (x i)] + COV[U'

<II>,

v • h' (x i)] replacing the LHS with

this equalivant expression and solving for E[P • v • h'(x i)] gives us EQ. 11.
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EQ. 12:

Equation (12) gives the standard procedure for deriving an

elasticity coefficient.

EQ, 13:

db' (x1)
---=-

dv

= b'1 (x1) •

x

= h • (X1 ) ' [ 1 + I] ) 0

EQ, 14:

du'(IT) = du' (Il)
dll
dv

dll

du' (Il) = u'' <Il>
dll

'::;:

where

dII
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= p • b' (x1 )

A '::; :

x

du' (Il)
dv

EQ 14:

Given that P, X, h' (x i ) are all positive, the sign of EQ (14) is the
same as the sign of U'' (Il)·
EQ. 15:

EQ. 11.

Eq. (15 ) is expressing the implications coming from EQs. 12 - 14 on

Equations 16 - 18 should be clear.

After proposition I, it is stated that if h''' (x i ) < 0, then di'/dx 1 < 0.
h" (X 1}
'
h
( 1 )_..,.
-''d ......__ _ _ X
dxl
X1 •

di'
dxl
= h' (x1 ) [h'' (x1 )

+

=

h'" (x1 )

•

h' (x1)

(+)

x1 ] - [h''(x1 ) • X1 • h'' (x1 )]
•

h' (x1)

(-)

+

h"' (x1) • X1
h' (x1 )

Thus h"'(x1 ) < 0 assures that

EQ. 20.

di' < O.
dxl

The first order condition is rewritten to incorporate v* and

the assumption of a risk neutral firm.
20.

dE(II) = E[p •
dx

v• ·

h'(x1)

-

r]

=

O

Eq. 21 replaces v* with (a•v + B) and rename the FOC: E[Z] .
21.

E[z] = E[p • (u • V+ J}) ·h'(x1)

-

r] = O

EQ. 22 is the result of comparative static analysis.

Taking the total

differential of E[z] and setting all differentials to zero except dx, da, and
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remembering that dv*/da = ( v- 1 ) , we have ,
dE [ z ] = E [ P • [ v" ] 2

•

h" ( x i ) ] dx + E [ P • v • h ' ( x i ) - P • h' ( x i ) + P • h • ( x i ) • ( a

· v + B ) • x · ( v - 1 ) ] da
Now the above equation reduces to :
dE [ z]

=

E [ P · ( V* ) 2

•

h" ( x1 )

dx

]

E [ P · ( v - 1 ) · h' ( x1 )

+

(1

•

+

g'j ] da.

Sett ing dE [ z ] to zero al lows ax/a« to be derived .
ax = _ P • E [ ( V - 1 ) • h' ( X1 ) • ( 1 + � ]
]
[
P · E [ c v· ) 2 • h" ( x1 > J
aa

EQ . 2 2 .

<

O

NOTE : When doing the comparative stat i c s one must remember that
X 1 = ( a • v + B ) • X so that

dxl
da

(v

-1) •

X

The s ign o f equat ion 2 2 is dependent on the numerator , since the
denominator is negative and the entire expression has a negative sign .

The

key to s igning the numerator is the fol lowing relat ionship :
E (x ·
EQ . 23 .

+

E [ ( v - 1 ) · h'

( x1 )

Cov [ ( v - 1 ) , h' ( x1 ) ( 1
23 .

+

E [ ( v - 1 ) · h' ( x1 )

EQ . 2 4 .

d [h'

=

y)

( x1 )

(1

dv

+

d [h' ( X1 )

Zl ]

=

E ( x)

· E ( y)

• ( 1 + g'J

g'J ] , bu t

•

(1

• (1

dv

h" ( x1 )

•

+

+

Cov (x, y) thus

]

=

=

E[ (v - 1) ]

g'J ]

=

E [ ( v - 1 ) ] · E [h' ( x1 )

+

X1
dv

•

h"

a. · X + a. · X • h " (x1 ) + X1
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]

+

So we have EQ . 2 3 .

0.

CoV[ ( v - 1 ) , h' ( x1 )
d [ h' ( x1 )

+ �]

=

• ( 1 + g'J

•

•

(1

+

g'J ]

( x1 ) ]

h"' ( x1 )

•

a. · X

gi ven tha t h" , h'" are nega ti ve , then

EO. 2 5 .

d(v - 1)
dv

d [h' (x1 ) • ( 1 + gj ]

dv

1

>

<

O

0

Thus equations 2 4 and 2 5 have opposite sign s , so the covariance is
negat ive , which means ox/oa. < 0 :. •
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PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND FACTOR PRICE DISPARITY
IN THE SLAUGHTER CATTLE MARKET : THEORY AND EVI DENCE
Data Appendix
Deta i l ed data were col lected on 69 pens of steer calves in
1 9 9 1 , 84 pens of steer calves in 1 9 9 2 and 65 pens of steer calves
in 1 9 9 3 a s part of a retained ownership demonstrat ion proj ect .

The

summary stat istics for variables of interest to this paper are
included in Appendix Table Al .
These steers were marketed on a grade and yield bas i s in the
spring of the year when three out of the f ive steers were est imated
to be at 0 . 4 inches of fat over the 12th rib .

The Cho ice market

pr ice and discounts for Select carcasses , Yield grade 4 carcasses
( $ 1 0 - 1 2 / cwt ) , carcasses over 9 5 0 pounds ( $ 1 0 / cwt ) , or carcasses
under 550 pounds ( $ 12 / cwt ) were negotiated with a commercial catt le
buyer in a compet it ive market .

The average l ive and dressed we ight

market prices for s imi lar types of steers were obta ined from market
quotes and revenue per head was calculated as if the steers had
been sold under a l l three marketing methods {Appendix Table Al ) .
The data are most representat ive of the upper midwest /western
corn belt region of the U . S .

The data also are l imited to the

March through June marketing time frame .

The emp irical results

generated are thought to be representat ive of this market ing area
and t ime

frame .

However ,

additional

research

is

needed

to

determine i f s imi lar results would occur in other marketing areas
and t ime frames .
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Appendix Table Al . Summary Statistics on 2 18 pens of S l aughter
Steers used for the Empirical Analys is of this Paper .
Var iable

Units

Live Slaughter Weight

Pounds

1 14 6 . 1 5

90.8936

Hot Carcass Weight

Pounds

730 . 84

62.8868

Dressing Percentage

Percent

63 . 74

1.3883

Y ield Grade

1 - 5

2 . 35

0.4457

Percentage Choice Grade

Percent

0 . 45

0.2.867

Mean

Calculated Revenue
Live Weight

$ / head

895 . 25

70.8636

Dressed Weight

$ / head

901 . 99

79.3132

Grade & Y ield

$ / head

9 04 . 4 7

81.5949
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